

Example Sums to Determine Pay off matrix

↳ A and B are playing a game with 3 coins
25p, 50p, 100p according to the following
rules

- (i) If the sum is even A will win B's coin
- (ii) If the sum is odd, B will win A's coin

Formulate the pay off matrix

→

		B		
		25	50	100
A	25	25	-25	-25
	50	50	50	100
	100	-100	50	100

Pay off matrix for player A

(If done with reference to player B)

		B		
		25	50	100
A	25	-25	25	25
	50	50	-50	-100
	100	100	-50	-100

→ Compare first row
with first column

$$\Rightarrow 25 + 25 = 50$$

hence A wins B's coin
= +25

then second row with
second column

$$\Rightarrow 25 + 50 = 75$$

number is odd B wins
A wins

$$= -25$$

then continue
same for all other
row and column

Player B will always use mini-max principle (Column)

- First find the maximum value in column

Example problems to determine saddle point

1) Solve the following game whose pay off matrix is given

		B		
		I	II	III
A	I	2	-1	8
	II	-4	-3	4
	III	-8	-4	0
	IV	1	-6	-2

→

		B			
		I	II	III	
A	I	2	-1	8	-1
	II	-4	-3	4	-4
	III	-8	-4	0	-8
	IV	1	-6	-2	-6

Row minime

Column maxime

→ Min max = Max - min = -1
 Hence saddle point exists
 Best strategy for player A - I
 Best strategy for B - II
 Value of game = -1

Instructions-

Player A will always use max-min principle (Row)

- First find the minimum value in row

Ex →

I	2	-1	8	-1
II	-4	-3	4	-4

-1 ← Minimum value

Then compare the obtained value and select the one which has maximum (greater) value

In our case it is -1

Player B will always use mini-max principle (Column)

→ First find the maximum value in column

Ex →

	I	II
I	2	-1
II	-4	-5

2 (-1)

Then compare the obtained value and select the one which has ~~maximum~~ minimum lesser value

Tip- Write down Row minima, Column maxima to not get confused

Example sums on games without saddle point

1) Solve the following game whose pay off matrix is

Player B

Player A

	1	2
1	3	-2
2	2	5

→

	B		Row min	$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{bmatrix}$ write this to not get confused
A	1	2	-2	
	1	2	(2)	
Column	(3)	5		

maxim

Mini max = 3 Max min = 2

There is no saddle point as Max mini is not equal to Min max

$$a_{11} = 3 \quad a_{12} = -2 \quad a_{21} = 2 \quad a_{22} = 5$$

A

We have

$$x_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{21}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})}$$

(Memorize)

$$= \frac{5 - (2)}{(3+5) - (-2+2)} = \frac{3}{8}$$

$$x_2 = 1 - x_1 \quad (\text{Memorize})$$

$$= 1 - \frac{3}{8} = \frac{5}{8}$$

$$y_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{12}}{(a_{22} + a_{11}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})}$$

(Memorize)

$$= \frac{5 - (-2)}{(3+5) - (-2+2)} = \frac{7}{8}$$

$$y_2 = 1 - y_1 = 1 - \frac{7}{8} = \frac{1}{8}$$

$$V = \frac{a_{11}a_{22} - a_{21}a_{12}}{(a_{22} + a_{11}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})} = \frac{3 \times 5 - [2 \times (-2)]}{3+5 - (-2+2)}$$

$$= \frac{15+4}{8} = \frac{19}{8}$$

Hence the solution of game is

Player	Probability of using strategies	
	I	II
A	$\frac{3}{8}$	$\frac{5}{8}$
B	$\frac{7}{8}$	$\frac{1}{8}$

Value of the game = $\frac{19}{8}$

Dominance rule

→ Row dominance - In row dominance compare Row 1 with Row 2 or 3 [or Row 2 with 3.]

→ If all the values of Row 1 is greater than ^{or equal to row} 2 then Row 1 is superior hence eliminate Row 2

inferior → R_1

4	6	5
5	6	3

 → R_2 dominates R_1

→ If any one value of Row 1 is less than any one value of row 2 then try combination of other row

Ex R_1

7	6	5
5	7	3
4	6	5

 → Since here R_1 has one value greater than R_2 (7 is > 5) we see R_2 and R_3 and since R_2 is greater than R_3 eliminate R_3

→ If all the rows have one value greater than others
 then try column dominance first and then try
 row dominance

(ii) Column dominance

→ Same as row dominance but applies in columns
 and eliminates superior values

Ex	I	II	III
I	3	5	7
II	0	-4	-2

Comparing column II and III we eliminate column III

(iii) Modified
~~Mixed~~ row dominance

→ Same principle but two rows are averaged with
 third, to compare with a row

Example -

I	2	4
II	5	0
III	0	8

Averaging 2nd and 3rd row = $\left(\frac{5+0}{2}\right) \left(\frac{0+8}{2}\right) = (2.5, 4)$

Comparing with first row, average is greater or
 equal to Ist - here

-) II	5	0
II	0	8

Modified column dominance

Same as modified row dominance but eliminate superior (Row eliminates inferior)

Problems on Dominance principle

Using dominance principle solve the following game

I	I	II	III	IV	I	I	II	III	IV
II	20	15	12	35	I	20	15	12	35
III					II	25	14	8	10
IV					III	40	2	19	5
					IV	5	4	11	0

→

	I	II	III	IV	Row min
I	20	15	12	35	12
II	25	14	8	10	8
III	40	2	19	5	2
IV	5	4	11	0	0

Column max

40	15	19	35
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Since $\max \min \neq \min \max$

↳ Convert into 2×2 matrix to apply x, y formula

Using row dominance

	I	II	III	IV
I	20	15	12	35
II	25	14	8	10
III	40	2	19	5
IV	5	4	11	0

Using Column dominance

	I	II	III	IV
I	20	15	12	35
II	25	14	8	10
III	40	2	19	5

→ (we use this because row dominance

can't be applied

(i.e. one value

of row is greater

than another)

Using row dominance

	II	III	IV
I	15	12	35
II	14	8	10
III	2	19	5

Using column dominance

	II	III	IV
I	15	12	35
III	2	19	5

hence we have

	II	III
I	15	12
III	2	19

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{31} & a_{32} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$a_{11} = 15 \quad a_{12} = 12 \quad , \quad a_{21} = 2 \quad , \quad a_{22} = 19$$

$$x_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{21}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})}$$

$$= \frac{19 - 2}{(15 + 19) - (2 + 12)} = \frac{17}{34 - 14} = \frac{17}{20}$$

$$x_2 = 1 - \frac{17}{20} = \frac{3}{20}$$

$$y_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{12}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})} = \frac{19 - 12}{(15 + 19) - (2 + 12)} = \frac{7}{34 - 14} = \frac{7}{20}$$

$$y_2 = 1 - \frac{7}{20} = \frac{13}{20}$$

$$V = \frac{a_{11}a_{22} - a_{21}a_{12}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})} = \frac{15 \times 19 - 2 \times 12}{(15 + 19) - (2 + 12)} = \frac{261}{20}$$

Solution of game is

Player	Probabilities of using strategies	
	I	II
A	$17/20$	$3/20$
B	0	$13/20$

Value of game = $261/20$

Use the dominance principle solve the following game

		1	-3	-2
		0	-4	2
	I	3	2	4
	II	3	4	2
	III	4	2	4
	IV	0	4	0

→

	I	II	III	IV	Row minima
I	3	2	4	0	0
II	3	4	2	4	(2)
III	4	2	4	0	0
IV	0	4	0	0	0
Column maxima	4	(4)	4	0	

As max-min \neq min-max

Using row dominance

	I	II	III	IV
I	3	2	4	0
II	3	4	2	4
III	4	2	4	0
IV	0	4	0	0

Using column dominance

	I	II	III	IV
II	8	4	2	4
III	4	2	4	0
IV	0	4	0	8

Using modified row dominance

	II	III	IV
II	4	2	4
III	2	4	0
IV	4	0	8

Averaging III and IV

$$\left(\frac{2+4}{2}\right) = 2 \quad \left(\frac{4+0}{2}\right) = 2 \quad \left(\frac{0+8}{2}\right) = 4$$

$$\downarrow \quad \quad \downarrow \quad \quad \downarrow$$

$$4 \quad \quad 2 \quad \quad 4$$

Eliminating (II)

Using modified column dominance

	II	III	IV
III	4	2	0
IV	4	0	8

Averaging III and IV

$$\left(\frac{4+0}{2}\right) = 2 \quad \left(\frac{0+8}{2}\right) = 4$$

$$\therefore \begin{array}{cc} \text{III} & \text{IV} \\ \text{III} & 4 \quad 0 \\ \text{IV} & 0 \quad 8 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$a_{11} = 4 \quad a_{12} = 0 \quad a_{21} = 0 \quad a_{22} = 8$$

$$x_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{21}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} - a_{12})} = \frac{8 - 0}{(4 + 8) - (0 - 0)} = \frac{8}{12} = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$x_2 = 1 - \frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$y_1 = \frac{a_{22} - a_{12}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})}$$

$$= \frac{8}{(4+8) - (0+0)} = \frac{8}{12} = \frac{2}{3}$$

$$y_2 = 1 - \frac{2}{3} = \frac{1}{3}$$

$$V = \frac{a_{11}x_{22} - a_{21}x_{11}}{(a_{11} + a_{22}) - (a_{21} + a_{12})} = \frac{4 \times 8 - 0}{(4+8) - 0} = \frac{32}{12} = \frac{8}{3}$$

Solution of game is

Player	Probability of wins strategies	
	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
A	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$
B	$\frac{2}{3}$	$\frac{1}{3}$

$$\text{Value of game} = v = \frac{8}{3}$$

Graphical Method

$$\underline{2 \times M} \rightarrow \begin{matrix} & C_1 & C_2 & C_3 & C_4 \\ R_1 & [& 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 &] \\ R_2 & [& 4 & 7 & 0 & 5 &] \end{matrix}$$

In this row is fixed column to 2 but column varies


$$N \times 2 \rightarrow \begin{matrix} & C_1 & C_2 \\ R_1 & [& 1 & 2 &] \\ R_2 & [& 3 & 4 &] \\ R_3 & [& 5 & 6 &] \end{matrix}$$

In this column is fixed to 2 but row varies

Also $N \times 2$ we consider upper boundary
and $2 \times M$ lower boundary

1) Solve the following 2×3 game by lower boundary graphical method

$$\begin{matrix} 1 & 3 & 11 \\ 8 & 5 & 2 \end{matrix}$$




$$\rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 5 \\ 11 & 2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Then use dominance rule to find game value

Solve the game by graphical method

$$\begin{bmatrix} -6 & 7 \\ 4 & -5 \\ -1 & -2 \\ -2 & 5 \\ 2 & -6 \end{bmatrix}$$

→ Bring it to $N \times 2$ matrix using dominance method



$$\begin{bmatrix} 7 & -5 \\ -2 & 5 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} -2 & 5 \\ 7 & -6 \end{bmatrix}$$

→ Then we use dominance rule to find out game value

3) Solve the following game by graphical method

	I	II	III	IV
A I	19	6	7	5
II	7	3	14	6
III	12	8	18	4
IV	8	7	13	-1

→ In this first reduce it to $2 \times M$ or $N \times 2$ using different techniques ex- Row dominance then solve by graphical method then find game value